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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
RAYCHELLE MERRIAM, : 
Docket No. 890484-CA 
Plaintiff and Appellant, : 
vs. : 
TODD MERRIAM, : No. 7 
Defendant and Respondent.: 
BRIEF OF THE RESPONDENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The Appellant is the Plaintiff mother in this appeal and 
the Respondent is the defendant father- The parties will be 
referred to as plaintiff or defendant throughout this brief. 
The divorce trial was heard by the Honorable Don V. 
Tibbs, District Court Judge, Sixth Judicial District In and For 
Sanpete County, on the 2nd day of August, 1989. The trial Court 
awarded custody of the parties' only child, a son, age 3, to the 
Defendant, and the plaintiff appealed the trial court's judgment, 
JURISDICTION 
Plaintiff filed her appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3 (2) (h) , Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, 1989, and Rule 3(a), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce on or about the 
28th day of June, 1988, case number 9444. Defendant was not aware 
of plaintiff's filing and filed a complaint for divorce on July 14, 
1988, case number 9448. At a hearing for temporary custody, 
visitation and support, the parties stipulated that the defendant's 
complaint would be treated as a counterclaim to plaintiff's 
complaint. 
The primary issue at trial involved the custody of the 
minor child of the parties, Drew Merriam, who was age 3, at the 
time of trial. 
A secondary issue involved the defendant's right to seek 
visitation with Carson Draper, plaintiff's son by another marriage, 
who resided with the parties throughout their marriage and whose 
natural father resided in Winnemucca, Nevada. 
The trial court awarded custody of Drew Merriam, the 
parties natural child to the defendant and granted the plaintiff 
visitation privileges. The trial court also granted defendant 
visitation privileges with Carson Draper, subject to the preferen-
tial visitation rights of the Carson's natural father. 
Plaintiff's visitation with her son Drew Merriam and 
Defendant's visitation with his step-son, Carson Draper, were 
arranged so the two children would be together as much as possible. 
Plaintiff has appealed from that Decree of Divorce. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
1. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In 
Awarding Permanent Custody Of The Parties' Minor Son To The 
Defendant Father. 
2. The Trial Court's Consideration Of Information 
Contained In The Custody Evaluation Report Was Not Error Because 
Plaintiff Introduced Evidence Of The Evaluation Report. 
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3. The Trial Court Did Not Error In Awarding Custody Of 
The Parties Minor Child To The Defendant Father. 
4. The Trial Court Did Not Error In Splitting Custody 
Of Carson Draper And Drew Merriam. 
STATUTES AND RULES 
Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 1989 
Rule 3(a), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action for divorce. The primary dispute at 
trial involved the custody of the parties minor child, Drew 
Merriam. A secondary issues involved the question of defendant's 
right to obtain custody of or visitation with a step-son whose 
natural father was still living and who had not relinquished his 
rights as natural father. 
Each of the parties sought custody of the minor child 
Drew Merriam who was the only child born to the parties. Defendant 
also sought custody, as against the plaintiff, of the minor child 
Carson Draper on the theory that defendant stood in loco parentis 
with Carson. In the alternative, defendant sought visitation with 
Carson. Defendant acknowledged the superior rights of Mr. Kim 
Draper as to custody and visitation with Carson Draper because Mr. 
Draper was not*before the court in this case and Mr. Draper had not 
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relinquished his right to custody or visitation with his son nor 
had his parental rights been terminated by any court. 
Course of the Proceeding 
A hearing for temporary custody, support and visitation 
was held on August 10, 1988. Pursuant to stipulation of the 
parties, defendant stipulated plaintiff be granted temporary 
custody of Drew Merriam, provided defendant was granted visitation 
every weekend pending trial. 
In November, 1988, plaintiff's first attorney withdrew 
and present counsel assumed plaintiff's case. Shortly thereafter, 
plaintiff's counsel requested that a pretrial custody evaluation 
be made by Utah State Department Of Social Services. The evalua-
tion was initially assigned to a Mr. Kreg Perry. However, 
Plaintiff challenged Mr. Perry's qualifications to conduct the 
evaluation and Mr. John N. Bagley, MSW, was assigned in January, 
1989, to do the evaluation and prepare the report in this case. 
The report was not submitted to the court and to counsel until June 
12, 1989. The case was tried to the court on August 2, 1989. 
Disposition 
The trial court awarded custody of Drew Merriam to the 
defendant father and the plaintiff was granted visitation. No 
custody determination was made by the trial court in this case as 
to Carson Draper. Plaintiff has custody of Carson Draper by a prior 
Decree. However, the trial court did grant defendant visitation 
privileges subject to the prior rights of the Carson's natural 
father to preferentially exercise his visitation rights. The 
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visitation scheme was arranged so both children were together 
during visitation regardless of whether it was plaintiff's 
visitation with Drew Merriam or defendant's visitation with Carson 
Draper. 
After the trial, plaintiff orally requested the court to 
stay execution of the judgment pending the appeal of the decision 
to the Utah Court of Appeals. Plaintiff did not state the basis 
of the motion. The trial court denied the motion. 
The Decree of Divorce was entered on August 14, 1989. 
Plaintiff filed her Notice Of Appeal on August 11, 1989. On August 
18, 1989, plaintiff filed a Motion To Stay Judgment with the Utah 
Court of Appeals. Oral argument was heard on September 13, 1989. 
The Court of Appeals awaited the filing of the transcript of trial 
before issuing a decision on plaintiff's Motion To Stay Judgment. 
Plaintiff's Motion was denied on October 16, 1989. 
Relevant Facts 
The facts recited in this section are referenced to the 
Trial Transcript and to the Record On Appeal. 
The parties were married to each other on November 22, 
1985. (RA 2) Plaintiff had a child, Carson Draper, by a previous 
marriage, and the child lived with the parties during the marriage. 
(RA 103). 
The parties had one child, Drew Merriam born to them of 
this marriage. (RA 2) At the time of the divorce, Carson Draper was 
5 years old and Drew Merriam was 3 years old. Because of Carson's 
age, he viewed defendant as his father. Carson's natural father, 
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Kim Draper, lived in and was employed in Winnemucca, Nevada. (T.T. 
41, Ins. 7-10) Mr. Draper sent monthly support payments to 
plaintiff but visited the child infrequently. (RA 80 para. 6, 13.) 
However, Mr. Draper had not relinquished his paternal rights to 
the child and Mr. Draper was not a party to this action nor was he 
a witness at the trial or present in the courtroom during the 
trial. 
Defendant testified that during the marriage, plaintiff 
revealed to defendant that she, plaintiff, had engaged in sexual 
intercourse with other men during the marriage and revealed the 
names of at least two of the men she had sexual relations with. 
(T.T. 59, Ins. 3-24) Defendant also testified that plaintiff 
further boasted to defendant about her pre-marital sexual experien-
ces which, combined with plaintiff's extra-marital sexual ac-
tivities, led to the eventual demise of the marital relationship 
between the parties. (T.T. 58, In 5-25, p.59, Ins. 1-25, p. 60, 
Ins. 1- 18.). Plaintiff denies she had extra-marital sexual 
relations. 
At trial, plaintiff testified that she provided most of 
the primary care of the children. (T.T.17, Ins. 3-6) She 
testified that a typical day for the minor children began at 5:00 
A.M., with placement at the baby-sitters before 6:00 A.M. (T.T. 10, 
Ins. 19-20, p. 20, Ins. 6-10) She testified that she earned 
between $300.00 and $500.00 per month (T.T. 26, Ins. 7,8). 
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Plaintiff testified about the custody evaluation process 
(T.T. 34, Ins. 13-25) and also testified as to the contents of the 
report. (T.T. 35, Ins. 18-25, p. 36, Ins. 1-11). 
Plaintiff lived with her parents after she left the 
parties residence. She states she left the defendant because she 
was Msick of him." (T.T. 42, Ins. 19-25). Her father testified 
that plaintiff and the two minor children lived with him and his 
wife for all but the last four (4) weeks prior to trial. (T.T. 53) 
Plaintiff admitted that under the circumstances that existed at the 
time of the trial, the two minor children had no male role models. 
Plaintiff's father slept during the day because he worked at 
nights. (T.T. 43, Ins. 1-4). 
Defendant testified that Carson Draper viewed him in all 
respects as a natural father and Carson referred to his natural 
father as "his buddy." (T.T. 56, Ins. 9-15) Defendant testified 
that he provided much of the primary care for Carson and Drew and 
his parents and his entire family participated in the rearing of 
the two boys. (T.T. 62, Ins. 1-17) He also testified that during 
the latter stage of their marriage he performed most of the primary 
care because plaintiff was out to Richfield or elsewhere every 
night. (T.T. 68, Ins. 18-25, p.69, Ins. 1-8). 
Defendant and defendant's mother testified that they 
viewed Carson Draper as their natural child and grandchild (T.T. 
56, Ins. 7-11) and Carson referred to defendant as "Dad." (T.T.56, 
In 11) 
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Defendant testified that he agreed plaintiff could have 
temporary custody pending trial because she agreed defendant could 
have visitation with Carson Draper and Drew Merriam during the 
pretrial period. Defendant testified that plaintiff refused to 
abide by her oral stipulation that defendant would be permitted to 
visit with Carson while the parties awaited the completion of the 
evaluation report and the scheduling of the trial. (T.T. 62, Ins. 
18-25, p. 63, Ins. 1-16) 
Defendant testified that plaintiff's father exposed the 
minor children to pornographic movies and Carson indicated an 
awareness of the portrayal of sexual activity. (T.T. 64, Ins. 16-
25, p. 65, Ins. 1-13) . 
Defendant recommended the visitation schedule that would 
permit the boys the optimum opportunities to be together (T.T 66, 
In. 25, p. 67, Ins. 1-5.) He testified that when both he and 
plaintiff were at work, he intended to place the children with a 
Day Care facility which provides pre-school training for the 
children and his mother would also be available to tend the 
children. (T.T. 68, Ins. 3-12, p. 75, Ins. 14-22.) 
Mrs. Joy Merriam, defendant's mother, testified she 
resides with her husband in Manti, Utah, where the parties resided 
during their marriage. She testified that she views and treats 
Carson Draper as her natural grandson in all respects (T.T. 84 
Ins., 17-25, p. 85, Ins. 1-13.) She testified that she and her 
husband would be willing and able to assist in the care and rearing 
8 
of the two minor children even to the extent of providing medical, 
educational or religious assistance. (T.T. 86, Ins. 1-7) 
Defendant's mother, Joy Merriam, testified that defendant 
rendered primary care all during the marriage and that defendant 
was a very good and patient father. (T.T. 87, Ins. 19 24) Heidi 
Johnson, a friend, also testified that defendant was a very patient 
and good father. (T.T. 95 Ins. 8-25, p. 96, Ins. 1-2.) 
Mr. Russell Meacham was called by defendant to testify 
as to his relationship with the plaintiff. Mr. Meacham was asked 
if he had sexual intercourse with the plaintiff and Mr. Meacham 
refused to testify, invoking his privilege against self incrimina-
tion. (T.T. 81, Ins. 18-20). 
The trial court granted defendant custody of the minor 
child Drew Merriam and granted visitation for plaintiff. The trial 
court further granted defendant visitation with Carson Draper, on 
the basis that defendant stood in loco parentis with Carson. 
However, defendant's right of visitation with Carson is subject to 
the preferential right of the natural father to visit with Carson. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The Trial Court Is Vested With Broad Discretionary 
Powers And Its Findings Should Not be Disturbed Unless They Are 
Shown To Be Clearly Erroneous. The Custody Award Was Not Based on 
Plaintiff's Moral Conduct Alone. 
2. The Trial Court Did Not Error In Considering The 
Pretrial Custody Report Since Plaintiff Elected To Introduce That 
Evidence. 
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3. The Trial Court Has Broad Discretionary Powers. It 
Is Free To Select The Evidence Which It Believes Is More Credible. 
4. The Trial Court Has The Discretionary Authority To 
Split Custody Of Minor Siblings If The Court Deems It In The Best 
Interest Of The Children To Do So. 
DETAILS OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT IS VESTED WITH BROAD 
DISCRETIONARY POWERS AND ITS FINDINGS 
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED UNLESS THE FIND-
INGS ARE SHOWN TO BE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT BASED ITS CUSTODY AWARD ON MORE THAN 
PLAINTIFF'S SEXUAL ACTIVITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS. 
Although plaintiff correctly states that a custody award 
should be based on more than the demonstrated morals of the par-
ties, plaintiff does not explain how the trial court in this case 
erred in failing to consider other factors. 
In arriving at its custody decision, the trial court 
found that the defendant treated both Carson Draper and Drew 
Merriam as his own sons and also found that the environment avail-
able to the minor child, Drew Merriam, through defendants family, 
friends and relatives more favorable than that available through 
plaintiff. The court further found that defendants earning 
capacity and employment was greater and more sound than plaintiff's 
because defendant had job related skills while plaintiff did not; 
that defendant and his environment would provide a better social 
climate for the minor child. (R.A. 81, para. 15- 20). 
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The trial court also found that the custody evaluator 
recommended that defendant be granted custody of the minor child 
Drew Merriam. (R.A. 81, para- 21), Also, the court found that the 
defendant is a patient father and reflects his love and concern for 
the children in his activities with them and in tending them; that 
plaintiff has engaged in extra-marital sexual relationships; that 
plaintiff had not been honest with the court, and that the parties 
both provided the primary care for the minor children. (R.A. 82, 
para. 23-26 . ) 
Obviously, the trial court relied upon more than plain-
tiff's extra-marital sexual relations in arriving at its custody 
award in favor of defendant. 
B. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH THE TRIAL 
COURT COULD PROPERLY FIND THAT DEFENDANT'S MORAL CONDUCT WAS 
SUPERIOR TO THAT OF PLAINTIFF. 
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erroneously found 
that defendant's moral conduct was superior to plaintiff's. 
Apparently, plaintiff believes that because she denied any sexual 
impropriety during her marriage to the defendant, the trial court 
could not find against her on that issue. 
Defendant testified that plaintiff admitted having extra-
marital sexual relations with other men during her marriage to 
defendant and when questioned, stated she did it because other men 
were exciting. (T.T. 59, Ins. 1-8) To overthrow the trial court's 
findings, plaintiff must marshall the evidence in support of the 
finding and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial 
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court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the 
clear weight of evidence and therefore, clearly erroneous. The 
Utah Supreme Court has held that when an appellant claims the 
evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's findings of 
fact, the Court will not weigh the evidence de novo and that great 
deference will be granted the trial court's findings especially 
when they are based on an evaluation of live conflicting testimony. 
In The Matter of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, (Utah, 3/28/89) The deci-
sion in Bartell is consistent with Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. (Addendum, Exhibit A) . Plaintiff has not shown that 
the trial court's finding on the issue of the parties' comparative 
moral conduct is clearly erroneous. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERROR IN CONSIDERING THE 
TESTIMONY OF RUSSELL MEACHAM. 
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erroneously based 
its finding of plaintiff's extra marital sexual relations on the 
testimony of Russell Meacham and on the inference that the trial 
court drew from Mr. Meacham's claim of privilege against self 
incrimination. Plaintiff does not cite the portion of the record 
or transcript of trial she relies upon to support this proposition. 
As the record indicates, defendant testified that plaintiff ad-
mitted to having had sexual relationships with two other men during 
the marriage and even provided defendant with the names of those 
men. 
There is nothing in the record to support plaintiff's 
claim that the trial court relied solely on the testimony of 
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Russell Meacham to arrive at its finding that plaintiff had extra-
marital sexual relations with other men during her marriage to 
defendant. Furthermore, there was ample independent evidence of 
plaintiff's promiscuity during her marriage to defendant and of 
plaintiff's relationship with Mr. Meacham that the trial court 
could properly infer that his answer would have been in the af-
firmative had he elected to answer the question posed by defendant. 
Even if the trial court had erred in considering Mr. 
Meacham's testimony or had improperly inferred that but for the 
claim of privilege against self-incrimination, Mr. Meacham would 
have admitted to sexual relations with plaintiff, the err was not 
prejudicial to justify reversal of the judgment. In Slusher v. 
Ospital, 777 P.2d 437, (Utah, 1989), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that harmless error does not justify reversal. There was suffi-
cient other evidence in this case upon which the trial court could 
find that plaintiff engaged in extra-marital sexual activities. 
Thus, the trial court's consideration of Mr. Meacham's testimony 
would not have been prejudicial error to warrant reversal of the 
trial court's judgment. (See also, Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Addendum, Exhibit B). 
D. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RELY SOLELY ON PLAINTIFF'S 
EXTRA-MARITAL SEXUAL ACTIVITIES IN ARRIVING AT ITS CUSTODY DETER-
MINATION. 
Plaintiff ignores other factors considered by the trial 
court in arriving at its custody award. Plaintiff persists in her 
claim that the only basis for the trial court's award of custody 
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of the parties' child to defendant was the trial court's reliance 
solely on the issue of plaintiff's extra-marital sexual activities. 
The other factors relied upon by the tria] court have been previ-
ously outlined in subheading A in defendant's brief and defendant 
will not restate those factors here. 
E. PLAINTIFF ERRONEOUSLY ASSERTS THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
AWARDED CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD TO THE DEFENDANT AS A MEANS OF 
PUNISHING PLAINTIFF UNDER THE "OUTMODED CONCEPT OF FAULT." 
In support of this unsupported assertion, plaintiff cites 
Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, (Utah App. 1987) and Davis v. 
Davis, 749 P.2d 647, (Utah 1988). 
The facts in Marchant are clearly distinguishable from 
the facts m this case. The decision in Davis is inapplicable to 
support plaintiff's claim that the custody award was based on the 
outmoded concept of fault to punish plaint]ff. Neither the facts 
in this case or the cases cited by plaintiff support plaintiff's 
claim that she was deprived of custody of the minor child Drew 
Merriam as punishment for fault. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN CONSIDER-
ING THE CUSTODY EVALUATION REPORT BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFF INTRODUCED TESTIMONY ON THE 
EVALUATION REPORT. 
The custody evaluation was requested by plaintiff and 
defendant stipulated to the evaluation. 
During the Dial, counsel for plaintiff elicited plain-
tiff's testimony regarding the evaluation process and report (T.T. 
34, Ins. 13-25, p. 35, Ins. 1-25, p. 36, Ins. 1-14.) Counsel for 
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the plaintiff also cross-examined defendant on the contents of the 
evaluation report. (T.T. 77, Ins, 12-18) 
Plaintiff now contends that the trial court should not 
have considered the contents of the evaluation report. Since 
plaintiff was solely responsible for introducing the evidence on 
the evaluation report, she should not now be permitted to complain 
that the trial court should not have considered the report. 
Plaintiff further contends that the trial court should 
have awarded custody of Drew Merriam to the plaintiff as a matter 
of law. However, the evaluator found that the children have bonded 
equally to the parties, each party demonstrated adequate parenting 
skills and the children demonstrate affection, trust, and respect 
for both parents. Still, after considering all pertinent factors, 
the evaluator recommends defendant be awarded custody of Drew 
Merriam because defendant has a stronger social support system, 
defendant's financial circumstances are better, the children 
respond to defendant's instructions better, and defendant appears 
more mature in long range planning and goal setting. (Addendum, 
Exhibit C). Admittedly, all recommendations contained in a custody 
evaluation report are "more judgmental than pure fact." However, 
even that concession does not support plaintiff's claim that the 
custody of Drew Merriam should be awarded to her as a matter of 
law. Plaintiff cites Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78 (Utah App. 
1989), to support her contention that she should have been awarded 
custody of Drew Merriam as a matter of law. Paryzek does not 
support that proposition. Instead, the court in Paryzek remanded 
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the case to the District Court for further findings to factor in 
the evidence in favor of the father as to the custody of the 
parties' minor son- The Court of Appeals acknowledged that stabil-
ity in prior custodial arrangements is an important factor in 
determining custody. 
In this case, although plaintiff was granted temporary 
custody pending trial by stipulation of the defendant, it was only 
with the provision that defendant have visitation every weekend. 
The evidence reflects that plaintiff resided with her 
parents pending trial for all but the last four (4) weeks when she 
moved into an apartment. (T.T. 53, Ins. 1-18). Since plaintiff 
and her mother began work at 6:00 A.M., (T.T. 36, Ins. 21-25, P. 
37, Ins. 1-5) plaintiff had a friend tend the children while she 
was at work. (T.T. 20, Ins. 12-14). If her friend was not avail-
able, plaintiff's grandmother, who was in her late 70's, was the 
alternate care provider. (T.T. 20, Ins. 15-20, T.T. 99, Ins. 1-
4) . 
On the other hand, defendant was residing in the home the 
parties purchased during their marriage and where the minor child 
lived since his birth. (T.T. 9, Ins. 13-25, p. 10, Ins. 1-9) When 
defendant was at work, defendant intended to utilize an established 
day care center or his parents to tend the minor child. Under 
these circumstances, defendants has as much, if not more, in his 
favor on the issue of stability as does plaintiff. 
The evaluator recommended custody of Drew Merriam be 
awarded to defendant because he believed the evidence favored the 
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defendant. The trial court had the discretion to accept or reject 
that recommendation. 
III. THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FROM WHICH 
THE COURT COULD FIND THAT BOTH PARTIES 
RENDERED PRIMARY CARE. 
Both parties testified that they rendered primary care 
to the children during the marriage. In stating that neither party 
was the primary caretaker of the minor child Drew, the trial court 
simply stated it believed both parties rendered primary care 
equally. (R.A. 82, para. 26). 
Plaintiff argues that because she had physical custody 
of the minor child during the pretrial duration, she should, ipso 
facto, be deemed to have rendered most of the primary care during 
that time. However, plaintiff began her work shift at 6:00 A.M. 
each morning. Thus the minor child was awakened at 5:00 A.M. in 
the morning to be taken to the baby-sitter. Defendant had the 
minor child every weekend and rendered the primary care during each 
weekend. Under these circumstances, the trial court had adequate 
justification to find that primary care for the minor child was 
rendered equally by the parties. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN SPLITTING 
CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILDREN. 
Given the facts of this case, the trial court did not err 
in granting custody of Drew Merriam to defendant while plaintiff 
retained custody of Carson Draper. 
As the record indicates, defendant would have liked to 
obtain custody of both Carson Draper and Drew Merriam if the facts 
17 
and the law would have permitted him to do so. (T.T. 11, Ins. 21-
25, p. 12, Ins. 1-9) 
In Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, (Utah, 1986), the trial 
court ignored the recommendations of a social worker and plain-
tiff's brother who was a professional counselor and awarded custody 
of one child to each of the parties. The Utah Supreme Court upheld 
the split custody award. The Court stated: 
"...The court did not follow the recom-
mendations made by the social worker or the 
plaintiff's brother. As child custody deter-
mination turns on numerous factors, however, 
that choice was within it's discretion." 
Similarly, in Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, (Utah 
1987), the Utah Supreme Court upheld a trial court decree which 
awarded three older children to the plaintiff father while awarding 
custody of the youngest child to defendant mother. Justice Durham, 
speaking for the court stated: 
"We decline to overturn the trial court. 
Where there is evidence to support a ruling, 
the task of determining the best interests of 
the child in a custody dispute is for the trial 
judge, who has the opportunity to personally 
observe and evaluate the witnesses. If a trial 
judge exercises his discretion in accord with 
the standards set by this Court, the decision 
will not be overturned." 
In this case, it is obvious that the trial court clearly 
recognized that the moral, social, physical and financial environ-
ment which defendant could provide greatly outweighed the benefit 
of keeping the siblings together. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant respectfully submits that the trial court did 
not err in awarding custody of the minor child, Drew Merriam, to 
the defendant and the trial court's decree should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Kenneth M. Hisatake ^\— 
Attorney for Respondent 
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EXHIBIT A 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 52 
Rule 52. Findings by the court. 
(a) Effect In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 
when the motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to, an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend- Compiler's Notes, — This rule is similar to 
merit, in Subdivision (a), deleted "and" preced- Rule 52, F.R.C.P. 
ing"in granting" in the first sentence, inserted Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53. 
the third and fifth sentences, rewrote the sixth 
sentence and added the last sentence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Denial of motion. 
—Divorce decree modifications. 
Adoption. —Easement. 
—Abandonment of contract. —Evidentiary disputes. 
—Advisory verdict. --Juvenile action. 
—Breach of contract —Material issues. 
—Child custody. Harmless error. 
—Contempt. —Submission by prevailing party. 
—Credibility of witnesses. Court's discretion. 
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EXHIBIT B 
Rule 61 UTAH RULLS OP CIVIL PROCEDURE 
record Bowen v Olson, 122 Utah 66, 246 P 2d 
602 (1952) 
Where the affidavit for publication of sum 
mons presented no evidentiary facts, a default 
judgment entered against the defendant can be 
attacked collaterally Bowen v Olson, 122 
Utah 66, 246 P 2d 602 (1952) 
Unauthorized appearance, 
Wife who had been personally served with 
process but had no actual knowledge of action 
was not entitled to relief from judgment 
against her and her husband on ground that 
appearance for her by attorney retained by 
husband was without her authority Plaintiff 
would have been entitled to default judgment 
against wife, and his position could not be 
worsened by unauthorized appearance over 
which he had no control Brimhall v Mecham, 
27 Utah 2d 222, 494 P 2d 525 (1972) 
Cited in Goddard v Bundy, 121 Utah 299, 
241 P 2d 462 (1952), Board of Educ v Cox, 16 
Utah 2d 20, 395 P 2d 55 (1964), Parker v 
Am, Jur, 2d — 46 Am Jur 2d Judgments 
§§ 200, 671 et seq 
C J S. — 49 C J S Judgment* ^ 228 et seq , 
237 
A.L R — Incompetence of counsel as giound 
for relief from state court civil judgment, 64 
ALR4th 323 
Relief from judicial error by motion under 
F R C P Rule 60(b)(1), 1 ALR Ted 771 
Propriety of conditions imposed in granting 
rehef from judgment under Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 60(b), 3 A L R Fed 956 
Construction of Rule 60(a) of Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure authorizing correction of 
clerical mistakes and judgments, orders or 
other parts of the records and errors therein 
arising from oversight or omission, 13 A L R 
Fed 794 
Construction and application of Rule 60(b)(5) 
Rule 61. Harmless error. 
Compiler's Notes — 'Ihis rule is similar to 
Rule 61, F R C P 
Rolfson, 525 P 2d 612 (Utah 1974), Dynapac, 
Inc v Innovations, Ine, 550 P 2d 191 (Utah 
1976), Olsen v Cummings, 565 P 2d 1123 
(Utah 1977), Pitts v Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc , 
589 P2d 767 (Utah 1978), Peay v Peay, 607 
P2d 841 (Utah 1980), Miller Pontiac, Ine v 
Osborne, 622 P 2d 800 (Utah 1981), Kohler v 
Garden City, 639 P 2d 162 (Utah 1981), St 
Pierre v Edmonds, 645 P 2d 615 (Utah 1982), 
Kanzee v Karuee, 668 P 2d 495 (Utah 1983), 
Pease v Industrial Comm'n, 694 P 2d 613 
(Utah 1984), Wiese v Wiese, 699 P 2d 700 
(Utah 1985), In re Estate of Chasel, 725 P 2d 
1345 (Utah 1986), Katz v Pierce, 732 P 2d 92 
(Utah 1986), Myers v Garff, 655 F Supp 1021 
(D Utah 1987), Wood v Weenig,736 P 2d 1053 
(Utah 1987), Fackrell v Fackrell, 710 P 2d 
1318 (Utah 1987), Tripp v Vaughn, 7J7 P 2d 
1051 (Utah Ct App 1987), Blodgett v Zions 
First Nafl Bank, 752 P 2d 901 (Utah Ct App 
1988), Ramon ex rel Ramon v Farr, 101 Utah 
Adv Rep 48 (1989) 
of Federal Rules of Civil procedure authorizing 
ichef fiorn final judgment where its prospec-
tive application is inequitable, 11 ALR Fed 
309 
Independent actions to obtain relief from 
judgment, order, or proceeding under Rule 
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
53 A L R Fed 558 
Lack of jurisdiction, or jurisdictional eiror, 
as rendering federal district court judgment 
"void" for purposes of relief under Rule 60(b)(4) 
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59 A L R 
Fed 831 
Effect of filing of notice of appeal on motion 
to vacate judgment under Rule 60(b) of Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 A L R l\d 148 
Key Numbers — Judgment <*=> 291 et seq , 
306, 307 
No error in either the admission oi the exclusion of evidence, and no en or 
or defect in any ruling or oider or m anything done oi omitted by the couit or 
by any of the parties, is ground for gi anting a new trial or otherwise distuib-
ing a judgment or order, unless lefusal to take such action appeals to the 
court inconsistent with substantial justice The couit at every stage of the 
proceeding must disiegaid any enoi oi defect in the pioceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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EXHIBIT C 
RAYCHELLE MERRIAM, PLAINTIFF 
V8 
TODD MERRIAM, DEFENDANT 
CIVIL NO. 9444 
JUDGE DON V. TIBBS, PRESIDING 
ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF: BRENT BARTHOLOMEW 
TTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT: KENNETH M. HISATAKE 
CUSTODY EVALUATOR: 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES 
OFFICE OF COMMUNITY OPERATIONS 
JOHN N. BAGLEY, LCSW 
Date Submitted: June 12, 1989 
RAYCHELLE MERRIAM 
Raychelle Merriam was born May 22, 1966. Both, of Raychelle's parents 
are alive and currently living in Manti, Utah. Rachelle is the fifth 
child of a family of six having two older brothers and sisters and one 
younger brother. She reported that her life as a child was normal and 
happy and that she enjoyed very close relationships with all of the 
family. Raychelle lived with her parents until her sophomore year in 
high school when she moved to Delta, Utah and lived with her sister. 
While attending school in Delta she met Kim Draper and married him on 
June 3, 1983. After their marriage Kim and Raychelle moved to Denver, 
Colorado, where Kim had secured employment at a horse race track. She 
stated that the marriage was extremely difficult. By August of 1983 they 
returned to Delta, Utah. Raychelle stated that both she and her husband, 
Kim, were too young and immature to deal with the responsibilities of 
married life on their own. Raychelle's first son, Carson, was born in 
Delta on December 18, 1983. The following March Raychelle and Kim 
separated and Raychelle moved herself and her son to Mt. Pleasant, Utah. 
Her divorce to Kim was final in August of 198'*. 
Raychelle related that she had been acquainted with her current 
husband, Todd Merriam, while she was in high school. After her divorce 
from Kim, Raychelle returned to school and graduated with her class by 
completing her courses via home study. Raychelle stated that Todd was 
out of school when she met him, and that he was viewed as a "prize catch" 
due to his popularity in the community. 
Raychelle and Todd were married November 22, 1985. Since Todd was 
living in Salt Lake City at the time they relocated to Midvale, Utah, 
upon their marriage. Raychelle recounted their time while in Midvale as 
being fairly stable and normal. She was pregnant at the time and stated 
Todd had a very difficult time accepting her body changes due to the 
pregnancy. She also felt extremely isolated and did not have friends or 
family in the ares. In July of 1986, Todd and Raychelle moved back to 
Manti, Utah, after the birth of their son, Drew on June 3, 1986. 
Raychelle stated that after the move back to Manti their relationship 
became even more distant and less satisfying. She stated that Todd was 
never at home and spent most of his time with friends. She said this was 
difficult for her since his friends were single people who liked to 
party, drink, smoke, etc., and she was not included or invited. 
Raychelle recalled that as time progressed Todd became more violent, used 
alcohol more, and his threats became more frequent. On one occasion, 
Raychelle said Todd threatened to kill her; and on another, threatened to 
kill himself. 
Raychelle stated that Todd was extremely jealous of her first husband 
and would not allow her to accept child support from him. She related 
that his insecurity and jealousy were a constant problem in their 
marriage. Raychelle's work history was one of accommodation, she felt, 
to keep the peace at home. She stated that Todd made her stop working 
several jobs because he was jealous of her working directly with the 
public. Raychelle is currently working at a Picadilly Plant packaging 
fish products for distrubution. She works four days per week from 6:00 
a.m. to 4:00 p.m.. Raychelle and her two sons are living with her 
parents in Manti, Utah. 
-1-
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
TODD MERRIAM 
Todd Merriam was born February 5, 1961, in Mt. Pleasant, Utah. 
Todd's parents are both alive and living in Manti, Utah. He was the 
third child with one older sister and brother. Todd related his 
childhood and youth as extremely happy with close reltionships between 
him and his parents. Todd stated that he was raised by his father to 
accept responsibility and respect other people at a very early age. He 
did not recall any events that were traumatic for him. 
The dates and basic historical narrative for Todd are the same as 
Raychelle's for the period they were married and living together. Prior 
to Todd's marriage to Raychelle, he did have one short-lived marriage. 
After his graduation in 1980 from high school, Todd worked for Manti City 
on a utility prower crew for one and one half years. Then he met and 
married Leslie Swan from Aurora, Utah, and moved to the Salt Lake City 
area. This marriage lasted two years between 1983 and 1985 and no 
children were born to the couple. 
As recorded earlier, Todd and Raychelle formed their union on 
November 22, 1985. Todd has many similar memories of his life with 
Rqychelle, but also many different perceptions of the reasons their 
marriage did not remain intact. According to Todd, their marriage was a 
good relationship while they lived in Salt Lake City. The first major 
conflict was when Raychelle decided to become pregnant without his 
consent or knowledge. Todd stated that, in retrospect, he did spend too 
much time with his friends at the beginning of their marriage. However, 
after Raychelle became pregnant he stated he spent more time with her, 
and that this damaged their relationship also, due to her constant 
demanding behavior and general irritability. 
Todd and Raychelle returned to Manti in July of 1986. Todd's memory 
of this time is similar to Rachelle's in that both indicated that their 
relationship was not satisfactory and that their marriage was close to 
its end. However, Todd remembered his behavior during this time in a 
much different way than Raychelle. Todd stated that he was extremely 
frustrated with Raychelle due to her seductive behavior with other men. 
Todd further stated that he was aware of at least one extra-marital 
affair during this time period, and several after their separation when 
Raychelle moved into an apartment of her own. 
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CARSON D.O.B.J 12-18-83 (Prior Marriage) 
DREW D.O.B.: 06/03/86 (Current Marriage) 
Both Carson and Drew were interviewed and observed on two occasions. 
The first session was with Raychelle, the second with Todd. The children 
were observed in interaction with each parent, and while involved in 
independent play activity. Carson and Drew are active, articulate and 
physically handsome children who appear normal for their chronological 
age. 
Carson, age 5, was extremely easy to talk with and was eager to 
listen to the conversation and offer his opinion for the first 10 
minutes, and was then distracted. His brother, Drew, age 3, was far more 
interested in play and did not participate in the conversation without 
being asked a direct question. 
Both of the children displayed appropriate affection to Raychelle and 
Todd, and neither showed any signs of fear or hesitancy with them. 
During the course of the interviews it was obvious that the children had 
formed bonds with both Raychelle and Todd. The childrens' response to 
verbal direction was very different, however, with each parent. Carson 
and Drew both ignored verbal instruction when given by Raychelle and 
continued with their activities in spite of her warnings. On the other 
hand, both children responded to Todd's verbal instruction without 
complaint and redirected their activities as requested. 
When asked simple questions about their feelings, and how they 
perceived the present situation, both children indicated that they loved 
both parents. Neither Carson or Drew showed a clear preference to either 
parent. The only response that was special came from Carson when 
Raychelle was discussing Todd's violent behavior on one occasion. As 
Raychelle was describing this incident Carson acted out a simulated 
violent confrontation with a cushion on the couch. He said he was 
showing me how men could be tough and hurt people. Raychelle stated that 
Carson had witnessed a fight she and Todd had at their home in Manti. 
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A. The child's preference 
Neither child expressed a strong preference and seemed to be 
equally at ease with both parents. 
B. Benefit of keeping siblings together 
There appears to be a significant bond between Carson and Drew. 
The two children were observed in play together and demonstrated a 
friendly, cooperative manner towards one another. This is a factor 
that needs consideration. 
C. The child's bond with one or both of the prospective custodians 
While both children demonstrated affection towards each parent, 
there was not a clear differential in the strength of the bonding. 
It may be important to note that Carson has experienced a bonding 
disruption in his infancy already; and this can have a pronounced 
effect on his ability to adjust to future, and similar, disruptions. 
This will be discussed further in the summary. 
D. The general interest in continuing previously determined custody 
arrangements 
Both Carson and Drew are being adequately cared for in their 
present situation. The joint visitation does not appear to be 
harmful to either child. However, the question of permanency is not 
resolved as the situation now exists. 
E-l. Moral character and emotional stability 
This issue is an area that may have importance in the overall 
decision. During the evaluation process Todd stated numerous times 
that the extramarital sexual behavior of Raychelle was an important 
factor in their marriage problems and contributed to his violent 
behavior. Todd also feels this should be a factor in the final 
decision of custody, Raychelle, on the other hand, contends that 
Todd is prone to violence, use and abuse of alcohol, and has in the 
past demonstrated emotional instability. 
E-2, Duration and depth of desire for custody 
Both Todd and Raychelle expressed a strong desire to have 
custody of the children. It is interesting to note that Todd only 
wants primary custody of the youngest child, Drew. He explained this 
by stating that since he was not the natural father of Carson, and he 
did not adopt him, he didn't feel he had a legitimate claim towards 
custody. However, he was very aware of the bond Carson and Drew have 
and would support this by asking for visitation with Carson. 
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E~3. Significant impairment of ability to function as a parent 
through drug abuse, excessive drinking or other causes. 
At the present time neither parent is impaired and both seem to 
have a healthy lifestyle. 
E~4. Reasons for having relinquished custody in the past. 
Not applicable 
E-5. Religious compatibility with the child 
This is not an issue for either parent. 
E-6. Kinship 
This is an issue for Todd. As mentioned earlier he is 
requesting custody of Drew only, with visitation right for Carson. 
Raychelle, being the natural mother of both children, is requesting 
custody of both Carson and Drew, During the interviews with the 
children it was noted that both children referred to Todd as dad. 
E-7. Financial condition 
Both Rachelle and Todd are employed. Todd is currently capable 
of supporting himself and children without assistance. Raychellefs 
employment is marginal; however, she does have plans to return to 
school and receive training as a dental technician. Raychelle's 
gross income per week is slightly less than $200.00 and she receives 
day care through the state. Todd's income is variable, but he 
reported a take-home pay of $450.00 to $500.00 every two weeks. 
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Both Raychelle and Todd were extremely helpful and cooperative in 
this evaluation process. It is unfortunate that this marriage was not 
satisfactory to either party and that the children will suffer the trauma 
of separation from one parent. 
In reviewing the information collected, there are few points that are 
usable to make a decision for or against either Raychelle or Todd. The 
children have bonded with both parents, and they demonstrate affection, 
trust, and respect for both parents. Todd has a stable home and reliable 
employment. Raychelle also has a regular job, plans to upgrade her 
employment skills, and would [in time] create a stable home life as she 
has done in the past. Both parents demonstrated adequate parent-child 
skills during the interview process, although the children did respond 
more favorably to Todd's direction. 
The only factors that are of real concern deal with their emotional 
maturity and their personal value systems. Since the information Todd 
related about Raychelle's promiscuity is not verifiable by this 
evaluator, it is difficult to make a judgement based on his word only. 
The same can be said about Raychelle's claims of Todd's violence and 
excessive drinking. Neither of these matters are documented, and law 
enforcement records cannot substantiate any behavior of a criminal nature 
by either party. 
Both Raychelle and Todd have had prior marriages that also failed. 
This will be Raychelle's second divorce, and Todd's second. Both parties 
married rather young the first time, and their first marriages lasted 
less than two years. In short, there is very little to base an objective 
judgement on in this case. 
Subjectively, this evaluator has formed some opinions regarding 
Raychelle and Todd and their possible abilities to provide a strong, 
stable, and healthy environment for young children. 
One: Todd has a much stronger social support system in the 
Manti area then Raychelle. 
Two: Todd is financially more sound than Raychelle. 
Three: The children respond to Todd's instructions more readily 
than to Raychelle. 
Four: Raychelle has the advantage of being female. The female 
is the most desirable parent for bonding in ages 0-six, 
according to current child development experts. 
Five: Todd appears more mature in his long-range planning and 
goal setting. 
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In closing, the recommendation of this evaluator is to grant 
custody of Drew, age three, to Todd Merriam, with liberal visitation 
rights. For reasons that are more judgmental than pure fact, this 
evaluator feels Todd Merriajn will provide the necessary care, stability, 
and structure for Drew to develop and mature into a responsible adult. 
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